Meaning of Strict Liability

The Doctrine of Strict Liability is a principle in Tort law that imposes liability on a person for causing damage even if they were not negligent and did not intend to cause the harm. In cases of strict liability, the defendant is held liable simply because a certain event occurred or a specific risk materialised as a result of an activity they undertook, regardless of the care they took to prevent it.

This doctrine is a departure from the general rule in tort law that requires proof of fault (either intention or negligence) to establish liability. It is based on policy considerations, primarily that those who engage in certain dangerous or non-natural activities should bear the cost of any harm that results from them, as the potential risk is inherent in the activity itself. This is sometimes referred to as "liability without fault", although it's more accurate to say liability is imposed without proof of the defendant's personal negligence or intentional wrongdoing.

The most famous exposition of the doctrine of strict liability is the rule laid down in the English case of Rylands v. Fletcher.

Rylands v. Fletcher (1868)

The landmark case of Rylands v. Fletcher established the principle of strict liability for the escape of dangerous things from one's land. The rule originated in England but has been adopted and adapted in many common law jurisdictions, including India.

Facts and Decision

Initial Decisions:

Decision in the House of Lords:

This case established a significant principle of liability that does not depend on proof of fault, focusing instead on the hazardous nature of the activity and the resulting harm.

Elements of Strict Liability (Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher)

Based on the judgment in Rylands v. Fletcher, the following essential elements must be present for the rule of strict liability to apply:

1. Bringing Something Onto Land:

The defendant must have brought something onto their land and collected or kept it there. The rule does not apply to things that are naturally on the land (e.g., naturally accumulating rainwater in a hollow, unless it is artificially collected).

2. Dangerous Thing (Likely to Do Mischief if it Escapes):

The thing brought onto the land must be something that is likely to cause damage or mischief if it escapes. It doesn't have to be inherently dangerous in itself, but its potential to cause harm upon escape must be foreseeable.

• Examples of things to which the rule has been applied include large quantities of water, gas, electricity, explosives, oil, chemicals, noxious fumes, widespread fire, and even things like mischievous animals (though this overlaps with specific animal liability rules).
• The key is the potential for mischief upon escape. Ordinary things may become dangerous if collected in large quantities.

3. Escape of the Thing:

There must be an escape of the dangerous thing from the defendant's land to the plaintiff's land or public place where the plaintiff is lawfully present. If the damage occurs on the defendant's own land, the rule does not apply; it is the escape that triggers strict liability under this rule.

• The escape means passing from the defendant's control to outside their control.
• Example: Water escaping from a reservoir to adjacent land, fumes escaping from a factory chimney into the air affecting neighbouring properties, a dangerous animal escaping from its enclosure.

4. Non-natural Use of Land:

This element, added by Lord Cairns, is crucial. The defendant's use of land must be "non-natural". This means it is an extraordinary or unusual use of the land, going beyond the ordinary use for the general benefit of the community.

• A natural use is generally any ordinary use of land, such as agricultural use, or uses for the common and ordinary enjoyment of land.
• A non-natural use involves bringing things onto the land which are not ordinarily there and which create an exceptional risk.
  • Example: Building a large reservoir in an industrial area (as in Rylands v Fletcher), storing explosives, manufacturing chemicals, accumulating large quantities of waste.
  • Contrasting Example: Storing water for ordinary domestic purposes, wiring a house for electricity for normal use, growing crops, or operating a small business office are generally considered natural or ordinary uses.
• The distinction can be debated and depends on the context, locality, and scale of the activity. Large-scale industrial activities, especially those involving hazardous materials, are more likely to be considered non-natural uses.
• In some modern interpretations, the emphasis is less on whether the use is 'natural' in a geographical sense and more on whether it creates an 'exceptional risk' compared to the background level of risk in the community.

5. Harm Caused:

The escape of the dangerous thing must have caused actual damage to the plaintiff. Unlike trespass, the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher is not actionable per se; proof of damage is essential. The damage must also not be too remote (though generally, if the elements above are met, the resulting damage of the type foreseeable from such an escape is recoverable).

If all these elements are proven, the defendant is strictly liable for the damage, subject to certain defences.

Defences to Strict Liability (Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher)

Even if all the elements of the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher are present, the defendant may be able to avoid liability by proving one of the established common law defences. Note that in India, the scope of these defences is severely limited for hazardous industries under the doctrine of Absolute Liability.

Common Law Defences to Rylands v. Fletcher:

1. Act of God (Vis Major):

As mentioned earlier, if the escape and resulting damage were caused solely by extraordinary natural forces that could not have been foreseen or prevented by any amount of reasonable human foresight and care, the defence might apply.

• Example: Damage caused by the escape due to an unprecedented earthquake or flood.
• However, normal severe weather is usually not sufficient; it must be an extraordinary event.

2. Act of a Stranger:

If the escape was caused by the unforeseeable and deliberate wrongful act of a third party (a stranger) over whom the defendant had no control, the defendant may have a defence. The defendant must show they took reasonable steps to prevent interference by strangers, but the stranger's act was unforeseeable and the sole cause of the escape.

• Example: A reservoir embankment is deliberately vandalised by a trespasser, causing the water to escape and flood neighbour's land. If the owner had no reason to anticipate such vandalism and had taken reasonable security measures, they might have this defence.

3. Plaintiff's Consent (Volenti Non Fit Injuria):

If the plaintiff consented to the dangerous thing being brought or accumulated on the defendant's land, and the escape occurs, the defendant may have a defence. Consent can be express or implied. Implied consent often arises when the dangerous thing is maintained for the common benefit of the plaintiff and the defendant.

• Example: A common water tank or electricity supply maintained by a landlord for the benefit of all tenants. If there is an escape and damage, a tenant might be deemed to have impliedly consented to the presence of the water or electricity, and the landlord might have a defence against a claim by that tenant (though not necessarily if the escape was due to the landlord's negligence).

4. Plaintiff's Own Default:

If the escape and damage were caused or contributed to by the fault of the plaintiff themselves, the defendant may have a defence. This is akin to contributory negligence or the plaintiff creating the situation leading to the escape.

• Example: If the plaintiff deliberately interfered with the defendant's reservoir, causing the escape.

5. Statutory Authority:

As a general defence to torts, if the defendant's accumulation and keeping of the dangerous thing, and its inevitable escape causing damage, are authorised by statute, the defence of statutory authority may apply (subject to the conditions discussed earlier, particularly regarding negligence and the distinction between mandatory and permissive authority).

Absolute Liability in India (M.C. Mehta v. Union of India)

It is critically important to note the development of the law in India regarding liability for hazardous activities. In the case of M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Oleum Gas Leak Case) (1987), the Supreme Court of India developed the doctrine of Absolute Liability. This rule applies to enterprises engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activities.

Under the rule of Absolute Liability, if an enterprise is engaged in a hazardous or inherently dangerous industry and an accident occurs in the course of carrying on such hazardous activity resulting in the escape of a hazardous substance and causing damage to anyone, the enterprise is absolutely liable to compensate all those who are affected by the accident. This liability is not subject to any of the exceptions or defences available under the Rylands v. Fletcher rule.

The court in *M.C. Mehta* held that the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher was not adequate to deal with the risks posed by modern hazardous industries. Therefore, for hazardous enterprises, the rule is one of Absolute Liability, not Strict Liability. The defence of Act of God, act of a stranger, or plaintiff's default are not available under the rule of Absolute Liability.

Thus, in India, while Rylands v. Fletcher still applies to non-hazardous accumulations and non-natural uses of land, for activities deemed hazardous or inherently dangerous, the stricter rule of Absolute Liability applies, severely limiting the available defences.

Origin: M.C. Mehta v. Union of India (Oleum Gas Leak Case)

The Doctrine of Absolute Liability is a principle of tortious liability that originated in India and is a significant departure from the English rule of Strict Liability established in Rylands v. Fletcher. It was developed by the Supreme Court of India in response to the inadequacy of the existing legal framework to deal with harm caused by hazardous industries.

Context and Need for a New Doctrine

The rule in Rylands v. Fletcher, while imposing strict liability, came with several exceptions (Act of God, act of stranger, etc.). In the context of modern industrial activities, especially those involving hazardous substances located near populated areas, the Indian judiciary felt that these exceptions were insufficient to protect the victims of industrial accidents. The potentially catastrophic impact of such accidents necessitated a stricter standard of liability to ensure that victims were adequately compensated and that industries took the highest possible precautions.

The Oleum Gas Leak Case (M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, 1987)

This landmark case provided the opportunity for the Supreme Court to formulate a new rule of liability for hazardous industries.

Decision of the Supreme Court:

Rationale for Absolute Liability:

• Social Justice: Industries engaged in hazardous activities benefit from them financially, and it is just that they should bear the social cost of any harm that may result from these activities. The cost should be internalised by the industry.
• Deterrence: Imposing absolute liability incentivises such enterprises to adopt the highest possible safety standards and take all necessary precautions to prevent accidents.
• Inadequacy of Rylands v. Fletcher: The common law rule was developed in a different era and was not equipped to handle the scale and potential for damage posed by modern hazardous industries.
• Capacity to Pay: Enterprises engaged in hazardous activities are typically large and have the financial capacity to compensate victims, unlike the employees who might cause the immediate harm.

The M.C. Mehta judgment marked a significant shift in the approach to liability for industrial accidents in India, establishing a principle of liability that is stricter than strict liability and is absolute in nature, offering greater protection to victims.

Distinction from Strict Liability

While Absolute Liability evolved from Strict Liability (Rylands v. Fletcher), it is crucial to understand that it is a distinct and more stringent principle. The key difference lies in the availability of defences.

Key Distinctions between Strict Liability and Absolute Liability:

Absolute Liability removes the defences available under Strict Liability, making the liability truly absolute once the essential elements of the rule are met.

Table: Distinction between Strict Liability (Rylands v. Fletcher) and Absolute Liability

Absolute liability represents a shift from the fault-based regime (even strict liability retains some link to the defendant's activity creating the risk for their own purposes) towards a principle of social justice and enterprise liability, placing the burden squarely on the shoulders of those who profit from potentially dangerous activities.

Application of Absolute Liability

The doctrine of Absolute Liability, as propounded in the *M.C. Mehta* case, applies specifically to entities engaged in hazardous or inherently dangerous activities. The scope of its application is determined by the nature of the defendant's enterprise and the activity being carried out.

Conditions for Application:

For the rule of Absolute Liability to be invoked, the following conditions must be met:

1. Enterprise Engaged in a Hazardous or Inherently Dangerous Activity: The defendant must be an enterprise (e.g., a company, factory, organisation) involved in an activity that is inherently dangerous or hazardous. A hazardous activity is one which poses a potential threat to the health and safety of persons or property in the vicinity or to the environment. This determination is made based on the nature of the substances handled, the processes involved, and the potential for harm if something goes wrong.
2. Accident Occurred in the Course of Carrying on the Hazardous Activity: The accident leading to the harm must have happened while the enterprise was conducting the hazardous activity. This links the harm to the enterprise's operations.
3. Escape of a Hazardous Substance: There must be an escape of a hazardous substance (gas, chemical, etc.) from the premises of the enterprise.
4. Damage Caused: The escape must cause damage (injury, death, property damage, environmental harm) to persons within the vicinity. The liability is to compensate 'all those who are affected'.

Key Features of Application:

• No Defence Available: As established in *M.C. Mehta*, no exceptions or defences, including Act of God, Act of a Stranger, Necessity, Plaintiff's Default, or likely even Statutory Authority (for the inherent risks), are available to the enterprise. If the conditions are met, liability is absolute.
• Measure of Damages: The court indicated that the measure of damages should be correlated to the magnitude and the capacity of the enterprise to cope with the damage. This suggests that larger enterprises with greater capacity might be expected to pay higher compensation, although subsequent interpretation has focused more on ensuring just compensation for the victim based on their loss. The principle is that the compensation must be substantial enough to act as a deterrent.
• Non-Delegable Duty: The duty to ensure safety in hazardous operations is absolute and non-delegable. The enterprise cannot escape liability by arguing that the accident was caused by the negligence of a contractor or third party they hired.
• Scope Wider than Rylands: The rule is not limited to escape from 'non-natural use' of land, but applies to the inherent risks of the hazardous activity itself, wherever it is carried out. It covers harm to anyone affected, not just landowners.

Examples of Activities to Which Absolute Liability Applies:

• Manufacturing, handling, or storage of dangerous chemicals or gases.
• Operations of atomic energy plants.
• Handling of hazardous waste.
• Other activities involving inherently dangerous processes or substances that pose a significant risk to the community.

The doctrine of Absolute Liability is a strong example of judicial activism in India, creating a robust legal framework to address the challenges posed by modern industrialisation and ensuring greater accountability for enterprises engaged in activities that pose a high risk to society. It places the responsibility for ensuring safety and compensating victims squarely on the shoulders of those who undertake such activities for profit.